

# Pro-Iranian Lobbies at Work- Part 1

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I had previously promised to do something on lobbies practically serving Iranian government policies. To understand the functionality of these lobbies we have to first have an idea of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry (MOIS), responsible for these lobbies in the US and Europe. this article will cover the history, structure and who's who of the notorious MOIS of Iran.

A little background

Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)a.k.a. Vezeerat-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (VEVAK)Little public Information exists on SAVAK's successor agency, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security [Vezeerat-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar - VEVAK ], initially known by the acronym SAVAMA.

The agency's first director was Major General Fardust, who was arrested in December 1985 for being a "Soviet informer." But after this major arrest the revolutionary government's keen desire to gain an upper hand over leftist guerrilla organizations may have influenced certain IRP leaders to relax their previously unrelenting pursuit of military intelligence personnel.

A 1984 reorganization of the security organization led by Mohammadi Rayshahri, concurrently the head of the Army Military Revolutionary Tribunal, created the Ministry of Information and Security which assumed the role formerly played by SAVAMA.

Key religious leaders, including Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, insisted on recalling former agents to help the regime eliminate domestic opposition. Consequently, some intelligence officers and low-ranking SAVAK and army intelligence officials were asked to return to government service because of their specialized knowledge of the Iranian left.

Others had acquired in-depth knowledge of Iraq's Baath Party and proved to be invaluable in helping decision makers. Although it was impossible to verify, observers speculated that some of SAVAK's intelligence-gathering operations were turned over to VEVAK. However, the ideological underpinnings of the new agency were radically different from its Imperial predecessor.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is Khomeini's philosophy of Velayat-e Faqih, or "Islamic Rule," which calls for imposing absolute authority over the populace, and on the other upon extending this authority to all Muslims, i.e. "exporting revolution."

### Span of the Secret Network

Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is ministry only in name, for it operates under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It is not accountable to either the cabinet or the parliament, has a secret budget, and stands above the law. Over the past two decades, it has grown into a huge machinery of political repression.

The Iranian regime's use of terrorism as an adjunct to foreign policy has developed into an organised and professional activity over the last 25 years masterminded by the MOIS. It has been used as a lever to gain advantages from Western countries or to exert more pressure on surviving opponents of the regime. Many of Iran's diplomats have a record of previous service with the MOIS, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (IRGC), and other security agencies.

The MOIS works in coordination with the Foreign Ministry in operations carried out abroad, making particular use of Iranian embassies worldwide as hubs for gathering intelligence and diplomatic passes for agents involved in terrorist activities. Internally, agents of the MOIS are rigorously tested before they are given security clearance and trusted enough to take part in operations which could potentially implicate the highest levels of the regime's leadership to state corruption should someone decide to expose the agency.

Many of the members, who themselves were handpicked from other security agencies inside the country, are first required to take part in the killing and torturing of dissidents, to ensure their loyalty to the regime and its Supreme Leader. Only the most loyal cadres are inducted into the organisation.

Throughout the years, on a number of occasions, the MOIS has gone through "internal purges", whereby agents showing weakness conveniently "disappeared" or "committed suicide". From 1997 to 1998, after a series of gruesome murders of Iranian dissidents by MOIS "liquidators" became public, the then-deputy Intelligence Minister Saeed Emami was jailed on conspicuous charges, and later "committed suicide" in prison.

The regime thus prevented any leak of sensitive information about the MOIS operations, as this would have compromised the entire leadership of the Islamic Republic. Such internal purges and murders within the MOIS sparked a feud at the highest levels of the agency, which landed top officials from the losing side in prison.

Let us take a brief look at some of the officials in this ministry that have been at work or have been left out by the body for some reason or other:

Ahmadinejad appointed his most trusted confidant as deputy Interior Minister

Monday, 30 October 2006

What does Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hope to achieve by appointing his right-hand man and most trusted confidant, Mojtaba Hashemi-Samareh as Deputy Interior Minister?

Mojtaba Hashemi-Samareh is a Revolutionary Guardsman-turned-politician. From the early 80's he became friends with Ahmadinejad. He is the only person that Ahmadinejad accepts to stand in front of him during prayers. Moreover, he is considered as the mentor for the so-called hardliner faction in Iran. He is always present in the president's meetings. All of sudden he is appointed as Deputy Interior Minister in political affairs.

Hashemi-Samareh has been appointed to the job at a time when Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi is the Interior Minister and Mohammad Bagher-Zolghadar is the first Deputy Interior Minister.

Pour-Mohammadi himself was Deputy Intelligence Minister when Ali Falaheini was the boss at the notorious Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Pour-Mohammadi's record is self explanatory when it comes to his key role in the mass execution of political prisoners in Iran in the summer of 1988. Boghaer-Zolghadar's record is equally applying since he has been one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards' Croup and the so-called Plain-Clothes agents which is the most potent force to the regime's Supreme Leader Ali-Khamenei. These agents were instrumental in the last presidential campaigns in favor of Ahmadinejad.

Alongside of these two criminal figures, Hashemi-Samareh can play a vital role, although in reality he has a much higher standing than two other individuals in the eyes of Ahmadinejad.

With the latest appointment of Hashemi-Samareh the team is complete. Boghaer-Zolghadar is the master mind of operational and security and Hashemi-Samareh is the ideologue for the right wing hardliner, Ahmadinejad guarantee the Assembly of Experts elections to turn in favor of Khamenei.

Terrorist background of Iran's Minister of Communications and Information Technology

Friday, 06 October 2006

First name: Mohammad

Last name: Soleimani

Date and place of birth: 1954, Kazeroon

Education: PhD in communications from Pierre & Marie Curie University in France

Suppressive Organs: Director of war affairs of Department of Electricity in the ministry of Culture and Higher Education and Director of War School at the Science and technology University

Background:

1. Deputy director of student affairs at the Science Ministry
2. Director of war affairs at the Science Ministry's Department of Electricity
3. Deputy Chancellor of Iran's Science and Technology University
4. President of the research organization of Iran's Science and Technology University

5. Administrative Director at Iran's Science and Technology University
6. Director of communications at Iran's Science and Technology University
7. Director of the War School at Iran's Science and Technology University

On January 8, 1983, two of the Iranian regime's agents were spotted by security guards as they were taking pictures in the vicinity of Auvers-sur-Oise, the headquarters of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. They fled the scene upon realizing that they had been discovered.

The two individuals were identified as Majid (alias), the cultural attaché at the Iranian regime's embassy in Paris, and Mohammad Soleimani, a hard-line Islamist from the Paris branch of the Iran Students Association, a front organization used by the Iranian regime Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) abroad.

Another plan jointly coordinated by the Intelligence Unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the MOIS was to dispatch a well-trained and armed 14-member hit squad from the IRGC to operate in France. Their mission was to assassinate Massoud Rajavi, the Iranian opposition leader based in Auvers-sur-Oise, by infiltrating his compound using the football field facing the compound.

As part of the MOIS plan, Majid and Soleimani traveled to Auvers-sur-Oise with surveillance equipment including highly-sophisticated cameras specially designed for the job. The plan was foiled, however, once French secret service agents discovered the pair.

Iranian notorious terrorist appointed as ambassador

Iranian notorious terrorist appointed as ambassador to the UN European Headquarters in Geneva

This January, the Iranian regime's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appointed Alireza Mo'ayeri, a notorious terrorist, as ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations European Headquarters in Geneva.

A summary of Mo'ayeri's record follows:

Mo'ayeri joined the intelligence bureau of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in 1979 and helped organize the regime's intelligence and repressive activities under direction of Mustafa Chamran and his brother.

He actively participated in the brutal suppression of students during the shutdown of universities during the "cultural revolution" in the beginning of 1980.

Mo'ayeri later boasted that after June 20, 1981, he had personally arrested nearly 200 students and subsequently executed many of them.

Alireza Mo'ayeri was dispatched to France as a diplomat in August 1984 to carry out assassination of dissident leaders, ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Mo'ayeri was in close contact and coordination with Vahid Gorji and Massoud Hendi, who perpetrated a series of terrorist operations in France.

Mo'ayeri went to Tehran in February 1986 but returned in May of the same year as the Khomeini regime's emissary to France. The Agence France Presse reported on May 22, 1986, that he had "called for the extradition of all dissidents... and in particular Mr. Massoud Rajavi." Mo'ayeri was subsequently appointed as the political deputy to then-Prime Minister, Mir-Hussein Moussavi.

Mo'ayeri was appointed as International Affairs Adviser to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, when he became President, and participated in all Supreme National Security Council sessions in his capacity as the person responsible for sponsoring terrorism and exporting Islamic fundamentalism.

In November 1992, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Mo'ayeri to head the Office of Liberation Movements, in which capacity he led the efforts to sponsor terror and export Islamic fundamentalism to countries such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Kashmir.

In December 1993, when the French Government handed the two assassins of Dr. Kazem Rajavi to the Iranian regime instead of extraditing them to Switzerland to face justice, Mo'ayeri went to Paris along with Amir-Hossein Taghavi, in charge of the Intelligence Ministry's European Affairs Bureau, and personally escorted the two to Tehran.

In 1998, Mo'ayeri was accredited as ambassador to France, in clear violation of a decision by the European Council of Ministers on April 29, 1997, which prohibited issuing visas to intelligence operatives of the Iranian regime or persons linked to terrorism. Mo'ayeri served as ambassador to France until 2002

Other figures of this Ministry are jey figures in key government positions. I shall release the information in the coming articles.

I hope these articles shed a little light on to the nature of this tyranny. It is a famous saying amongst Iranians that "a Python will never give birth to a dove"!!